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of Zygmunt Bauman 
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Introduction 
 
According to Zygmunt Bauman most sociological narratives tend to ignore moral and ethical issues 
in relation to issues of cultural belonging and mechanisms of cultural exclusion. In contrast, in 
Bauman’s work ethical and moral problems have been recurrent concerns, and can be found in 
every aspect of his writing from his understanding of the Holocaust to later concerns about the 
transition of a solid to a liquid form of modernity, consumption, the Other and ambivalence. In his 
conversations with Michael Hviid Jacobsen and Keith Tester, Bauman explains that the ‘moral law 
inside me’ as identified by Immanuel Kant ‘is to me an axis around which all other secrets of the 
human condition rotate’ (Bauman, Jacobsen and Tester 2014:68). Bauman’s ethical concerns are 
Other directed in that whatever constitutes ethics should be beyond ourselves and our own desires 
and self-interest. Bauman’s ethical stance was most clearly outlined initially in Postmodern Ethics 
(1993) and Life in Fragments (1995) in which he identifies the place of contemporary of morality 
within what appears to be the post ethical, post-legislative postmodern/liquid modern condition. 
The chapter explores how, what Bauman identifies as the ‘moral law inside me’ and how this 
shapes our relationship with the Other. Bauman goes on to draw upon Emmanuel Lévinas’s opinion 
that the ‘primal scene’ of morality is sphere of the ‘face to face’ and that being with the Other and 
for the Other should form the basis of contemporary ethics. The chapter will explore how Bauman’s 
underpinning acceptance of Kant, which manifests itself most forcefully in Bauman’s underpinning 
anthropological conception of culture that leads to a misunderstanding of Lévinas within Bauman’s 
ethical writing. For Bauman the moral capacity of people that allows them to form communities is 
established via a cultural link between self and Other in which the moral self becomes its own 
interpreter of the needs of the Other. The Other is not unknown to us as a specific human individual 
Other, rather we come to understand the Other as type of person or set of characteristics, not a 
unique individual. The chapter examines the possible negative consequence s of conceiving the 
Other as a generalised Other; Bauman’s account of the adiaphorizing effects of social processes 
that encourage moral irrelevance and dehumanization of the Other and the possibilities of a renewal 
of an ethical life via the creation of a new public sphere. 
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Bauman, Buber and the Other 
 
It is commonly assumed that Zygmunt Bauman’s work is concerned with giving voice to the ex- 
cluded Other. Michael Hviid Jacobsen and Sophia Marshman suggest that Bauman’s metaphors 
are inherently moral ‘they give voice to the voiceless, they recall us to our inescapable human and 
moral responsibility for ‘the Other’ and, in addition, that ‘Bauman’s work on postmodernity/‘liquid 
modernity’ has been dedicated to providing a voice for the “new weeds”; the poor, the indolent, 
the socially excluded, essentially those flung to the margins of society by the unstoppable march 
of global capitalism and consumer society (Jacobsen and Marshman 2008:22). In a similar fashion 
Tony Blackshaw suggests that Bauman’s metaphors ‘provide him with a means for giving voices 
to the socially excluded’ (Blackshaw 2005:76). Bauman himself has also made it clear that the 
silencing of the voice of the Other is a central aspect and precondition for genocide (Bauman 
2009:98): ‘Whenever and wherever an omnipotent force stifles the voices of the weak and the 
hapless instead of listening to them, it stays on the wrong side of the ethical divide between good 
and evil’ (Bauman 2009:96). Bauman has also warned against ‘abstract standards imposed from 
without’ upon the Other and describes the damaging consequences for managing the Other without 
a voice in the following terms: 
 
 
But as one could only expect in the case of an asymmetrical social relation, quite a different sight greets 
the eyes when the relationship is scanned from the opposite, receiving end (in other words, through the 
eyes of the ‘managed’), and quite a different verdict is then voiced (or rather would be voiced, if people 
assigned to that end acquired a voice) it is the sight of unwarranted and uncalled-for repression, and the 
verdict is one of illegitimacy and injustice (Bauman 2009:196-197). 
 
 
The central focus of Postmodern Ethics (1993) is an evaluation of what Bauman understands by 
 
‘the postmodern perspective’ or the ‘postmodern moral crisis’ much of which remains applicable 
in Bauman’s liquid turn writings. Liquid modernity is identified Bauman as a contemporary inter- 
regnum; a period of transition without clear direction in which the solid modern ways of working 
are no longer effective, but new ways of working have yet to be devised. For Bauman the way out 
of the contemporary interregnum is by the creation of a new public sphere rooted in moral proxim- 
ity. Taking his starting point from Emmanuel Lévinas, for Bauman moral responsibility involves 
‘being for the Other before one can be with the Other’. Being with and for the Other is ‘the first 
reality of the self, a starting point rather than a product of society’ (Bauman 1993:13). This princi- 
ple for engagement with the Other is said to have no foundation, cause or determining factor. 
3 
"This is an Accepted Manuscript of a book chapter published by Routledge in Beyond Bauman: critical 
engagements and creative excursions, on 04/11/16, available online: https://www.routledge.com/Beyond-
Bauman-Critical-engagements-and-creative-excursions/Jacobsen/p/book/9781472476111  ” 
 
 
However, there is an inability in Bauman’s work to draw upon Lévinas effectively because 
of two overlapping underpinning assumptions that Bauman makes: first, his underpinning Kantian 
perspective on morality and second his underpinning anthropological conception of culture. 
Martin Buber’s I and Thou (1958) provides an informed critique of Kant’s epistemology that had 
a significant influence on Lévinas’s ethical stance in relation to the Other; a stance that has been 
ignored by Bauman. Buber makes a distinction between I-It and I-Thou. These terms describe two 
possible ways of being in relation to the Other. For Buber, the self is always in a relation of some 
description with the Other. The central issue is how the self will relate to the Other. In the I-It mode 
of being which Bauman adopts, the self considers the Other as an object of his or her activities and 
thoughts and fails to understand the true presence of the Other. In contrast, the I-Thou/I-You mode 
of being involves mutuality between the self and other, a ‘meeting’ between self and other; in which 
the self is affected by the relation just as much as the Other is 
 
 
the primary word I-Thou can be spoken only with the whole being. Concentration and fusion into the 
whole being can never take place through my agency, nor can it ever take place without me. I become 
through my relation to the Thou as I become I, I say Thou. All real living is meeting (Buber 1958:11). 
 
 
Buber uses the term ‘between’ to describe an ontological category where a ‘meeting’ occurs be- 
tween self and Other; a ‘the narrow ridge between subjective and objective where I and Thou meet’ 
(Buber 1955:204). It is ‘a sphere which is common to them but which reaches out beyond the 
special sphere of each’ (Buber 1955:203). It is here that ‘genuine dialogue’ takes place between 
self and Other and this is central to Buber’s conception of inclusion. When ‘genuine dialogue’ 
occurs ‘each of the participants really has in mind the other or others in their present and particular 
being and turns to them with the intention of establishing a living mutual relation between himself 
and them’ (Buber 1955:19). If the self ‘turns’ towards the standpoint of the Other, and if the other 
‘turns’ toward the standpoint of the self, genuine dialogue can arise: 
 
 
 
The extension of one’s own concreteness, the fulfilment of the actual situation of life, the complete 
presence of the reality in which one participates. Its elements are first, a relation of no matter what kind, 
between two persons, second an event experienced by them in common, in which at least one of them 
actually participates, and third, the fact that this one person, without forfeiting anything of the felt reality 
of his activity, at the same time lives through the common event from the standpoint of the other (Buber 
1955:97). 
4 
"This is an Accepted Manuscript of a book chapter published by Routledge in Beyond Bauman: critical 
engagements and creative excursions, on 04/11/16, available online: https://www.routledge.com/Beyond-
Bauman-Critical-engagements-and-creative-excursions/Jacobsen/p/book/9781472476111  ” 
 
 
The moral law that Kant identified within the person is described as a categorical imperative; un- 
derpinning the categorical imperative is what Kant refers to as ‘duty’. For Kant the action is the 
same whether the person is acting from duty or acting in accordance with duty. The difference 
relates to the motivation underpinning the action. However, the categorical imperative is not in 
itself moral, because its use does not involve thinking about morals. The individual is assumed by 
Kant to act without agency, rather the self acts because it is their duty; even if the action is against 
the self’s own interests or desires. In a similar fashion, Bauman argues that morality has a ‘primal’ 
status that pre-dates socially constructed rules of proper behaviour and assumes that people are 
existentially moral beings. This does not mean that people are by their nature ‘good’ but it does 
mean that evil presents itself as a distortion of our moral responsibilities. Making our position both 
uncomfortable and our responsibility for the Other ambivalent. The Kantian subject regards the 
Other beings as an ‘It’ rather than a ‘Thou/You’. Kant is primarily interested in discussing human 
freedom within the context of what he considered to be the universal validity of moral principles 
within a transcendental sphere, and Kant has little interest in the interactions between real persons. 
For Kant the ‘I’ is not meant to be me as an first-hand, individual person but me as a rational 
member of a ‘kingdom of ends’ which because of its universal nature, also includes the opinion of 
myself within an abstract idea of a community – with a pre-established harmony, regulated by 
practical reason, common to all members that guarantees universality. In Bauman’s work, ‘king- 
dom of ends’ becomes the anthropological conception of culture. In Kant’s ethics there is no con- 
flict or strain between individual autonomy and universalism; because ‘we’ as the plural form of 
‘I’ and the will of rational beings is as such universal. The ‘kingdom of ends’ provides the universal 
perspective of rational members of the community. Accepting a universalizing procedure requires 
observance of the rule and asking how I would feel if I were in the position of the Other. However, 
this is not the same as taking into account the real opinions and feelings of a concrete Other. As 
such Kant’s philosophy has difficulty coming to terms with a concept of alterity. In contrast to the 
attitude of the Kantian subject where the attitude of an I toward the Other is that of an It, for Buber 
when we enter into a relationship with a You, we engage in a dialogue with an actually existing 
whole person and as such transcend the Kantian universal perspective provided by the ‘kingdom 
of ends’. The I-Thou/I-You relation is ‘unmediated’ in that there is no prior knowledge or precon- 
ceived conceptual understanding of You. 
 
 
Culture 
 
In the introduction to the second edition of Culture as Praxis (1973/1999) Bauman explains that 
an influential conception of culture emerged from orthodox anthropology which looked at culture 
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as providing regularity: ‘an aggregate … a coherent system of sanction-supported pressures, inte- 
riorized values and norms, and habits which assured repetitiveness (and thus also predictability) of 
conduct at the individual level’ (Bauman 1973/1999:xvii). Although in his liquid turn writings 
Bauman strongly rejected the continuation of anything like a ‘structure of society’ or a ‘culture’ in 
the orthodox anthropological sense, he also understands that human interaction has a non-random 
quality. Bauman does not escape this view of culture in the orthodox anthropological sense of ‘the 
way we do things around here’ in his social analysis and ethical writings. The role of the sociologist 
for Bauman remains the task of coming to an understanding of the non-random quality of human 
interaction. It is this non-random quality of human interaction that allows us to have an understand- 
ing of ‘we’ the people who share the culture. Apart from the practical problem that without an 
understanding of culture, the Other could not be encountered through consciousness, Bauman un- 
derstands the role of culture as an important resource in the processes of creating an individual’s 
social identity as distinct from personal identity and which underpins the processes in the formation 
of the Other. If we want to capture the nature of cultural identity Bauman explains, we need to 
accept that ‘identities retain their distinct shape only in as far as they go on ingesting and divesting 
cultural matter seldom of their own making. Identities do not rest on the uniqueness of their traits, 
but consist increasingly in the distinct ways of selecting/recycling/rearranging the cultural matter 
which is common to all’ (Bauman 1973/1999:xlv). Bauman remains a sociologist and does not 
reject or ignore the concept of culture in social life. Culture is more than simply common 
knowledge or customary ways of behaving, the practice of the way we do things around here. Our 
understanding of ‘humanity’ is a cultural project with Bauman’s ethical writings, as are the skills 
of dialogue and negotiation. Individual people rely upon knowledge of how to deal with situations 
and culture provides guidance on duty, on how to behave in any given situation, the responses we 
can expect from those around us and if we choose to behave in one way rather than another what 
responses we can expect. Our cognitive frames of reference, the resources that underpin our ability 
to interpret the world around us are shaped by the culture we are socialised into. 
In its conceptual role as a sociological conception of Kant’s ‘kingdom of ends’, Bauman’s 
conception of culture provides the tools for consciousness – knowledge, cognition, language. To 
think beyond culture is beyond a person’s cognitive power and ability. Culture also provides onto- 
logical solidarity, a foundation to the ‘we’ experience that allows us to view people like us, who 
share our culture, as the same and not as the Other. The appearance of the Other is never a pleasant 
surprise because it damages the perception of the world as ‘our’ world. We now know that the other 
also exists in the world but they are not part of the ‘we’ relationship: ‘moral selves may be dissolved 
in the all-embracing “we” – the moral “I” being just a singular form of ethical “s/he”; whatever is 
moral when stated in the first person remains moral when stated in the second or third’ the first 
6 
"This is an Accepted Manuscript of a book chapter published by Routledge in Beyond Bauman: critical 
engagements and creative excursions, on 04/11/16, available online: https://www.routledge.com/Beyond-
Bauman-Critical-engagements-and-creative-excursions/Jacobsen/p/book/9781472476111  ” 
 
 
premise when considering moral phenomena is ‘to treat the “we” as the plural form of “I”’(Bauman 
 
1993:47). 
 
For Bauman a moral life must have an objective aspect beyond feelings of pleasure and per- 
sonal satisfaction. Bauman’s refusal to engage with, or listen to the voice of the Other is seen most 
clearly in Bauman’s views on sexuality. Sexuality is a central aspect of the affective aspect of 
human life. It is unclear why some of the behaviours identified by Bauman in relation to sexuality 
are necessarily immoral. Eroticism and the conscious enjoyment of sexual relations, for example 
are identified by Bauman as immoral even when the activities are engaged in by consenting adults. 
As enjoyment when ‘severed from its age old-integration with reproduction, kinship and the gen- 
erations’ makes identity fragment into episodes and prevents a cohesive life strategy to emerge and 
leads to the floating of responsibility. The enjoyment of sexuality in this manner: 
 
 
denies the moral significance of even the most intimate inter-human interaction. As a result, it exempts 
core elements of human interrelationships from moral evaluation. It adiaphorizes the parts of human 
existence which the adiaphoric mechanisms of bureaucracy and business could not (nor did not need, or 
wish, to) reach (Bauman 1995:269). 
 
 
Bauman’s unsupported comments on sexuality suggest that he views such activities as warranting 
a ‘primal’ exclusion and demonstrate that he makes a distinction between ‘good’ desires and un- 
tamed or ‘bad’ desires; and that such ‘bad’ desires should be rejected and excluded from the public 
sphere into the realm of the ‘private’. What Bauman is doing here is the recreation of the ‘closet’ 
in liquid modern form; and as such attempting to undermine one of the success stories of life poli- 
tics, the politicisation of the personal in the area of sexuality. Effective participation in the public 
sphere is not possible if exclusion on the basis of sexuality is permissible. Since Michel Foucault’s 
work on sexuality, it is no longer possible to look at sexuality solely in terms of the natural cycle 
of generations. Life politics is a politics of the first person with a focus on quality of life issues in 
relation to personal identity. 
 
 
Bauman, Ethics and the Other 
 
In Life in Fragments (1995) Bauman builds upon his discussion of the place of morality within the 
post ethical, post-legislative postmodern condition. Solid modernity signals the end of God’s com- 
mandment and the emergence of reason as the basis for legislating morality. Solid modernity con- 
tained within it an impulse or desire for ‘societal self-improvement’ based upon the ‘urge to con- 
struct a perfect, harmonious world for humans’ (Bauman 1995:173). Morality within solid moder- 
nity was based upon the imposition of a moral code that does more than describe what people do 
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but prescribes moral behaviour. The code was designed to prevent evil and abolish ambivalence. 
However such moral codes lift personal responsibility for wrongs committed by the individual. The 
solid modern person does not need to trust their own moral judgement as they become increasingly 
dependent on the expertise of experts. Moral codes are designed to allow the solid modern person 
to escape from fear, but have the unforeseen consequence of enhancing the fear and feeling of 
powerlessness in the face of threats identified by experts. As Bauman often repeats, in solid mo- 
dernity moral responsibilities are taken away from the individual and placed in the hands of agen- 
cies and become subject to what Hannah Arendt described as the ‘rule of nobody’, generating a 
tendency towards ‘adiaphorization’. 
However, the crisis of ethics in the postmodern condition does not necessarily mean the end 
of morality: ‘it is possible now, nay inevitable, to face the moral issues point blank, in all their 
naked truth, as they emerge from the life experience of men and women, and as they confront moral 
selves in all their irreparable and irredeemable ambivalence’ (Bauman 1995:43). We only share 
that small part of ourselves that is relevant for the encounters we engage in and nothing more, as 
such in the postmodern condition encounters between people are fragmentary and episodic; we 
only ever interact with a fraction of the self with much of the Other classed as private and as such 
it remains unknown to us. Most encounters have no lasting legacy the events pass with little or no 
significance for the individuals concerned. 
In the postmodern/liquid modern era of ‘unadulterated individualism’, ethics has become de- 
rided as typically modern and there has been a significant degree of emancipation from such con- 
straints by an aestheticisation of ethics. Postmoderns do not trust any moral authority. For Bauman 
people are morally ambivalent, filled with uncertainty and neither by nature good or bad. Moreover, 
moral behaviour is ‘non-rational’ and based in the realm of personal autonomy and as such cannot 
be guaranteed by the state or other authorities designing the context in which behaviours take place, 
rather people have to learn to live morally without such guarantees. Moral behaviour is described 
by Bauman as ‘aporetic’ meaning that no action is unambiguously good or bad and all actions: ‘if 
acted upon in full, leads to immoral consequences’ (Bauman 1993:11). In an argument that follows 
John Macmurrary’s communitarianism, Bauman argues that the moral self has to act in a manner 
that is unselfish, in that the moral self must give up some aspect of themselves. 
Bauman acknowledges that being with the Other and for the Other can lead to the destruction 
of the individual autonomy of the Other, to the domination and oppression of the Other. Although 
this issue and how liquid modern people can avoid destroying the individual autonomy of the Other 
is not explained. Bauman’s opinion is that morality is ‘not universalizable’, but because his starting 
point is Kant, Bauman does make universal statements to support his position and at the same time 
from a Kantian perspective rejects the nihilist idea that morality as something that is local and 
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temporary. Such universal statements include that we should not do harm to others as this agrees 
with their self-interest and in addition, that ‘every reasonable person must accept that doing good 
to others is better than doing evil’ (Bauman 1993:27). For Bauman it is the moral capacity of people 
that allows them to form communities; to recognise and have concern for the emotions of others 
(Bauman 1993:33), we have the capacity to do this because we have a cognitive frame of reference 
that gives us the skills to read the emotion of the Other and because we share such emotions and 
their meaning is clear to us. Morality becomes personalised when it is released from the artificial 
and rigid ethical codes found within solid modernity. It is the appeal to abstract principles that saps 
the moral prerogatives of communities. When such abstract ethical codes make their appearance 
then our moral impulse is suppressed. Institutions that attempt to morally protect the community 
releases the individual from any personal moral responsibility for the Other. In solid modernity 
there is a public space but it contains no moral proximity, such public space is characterised by 
estrangement from intimacy with the Other. 
Again taking his starting point from Lévinas, Bauman argues that the ‘primal scene’ of mo- 
rality is sphere of the ‘face to face’; we encounter the Other as a naked and defenceless face, not 
an abstract face but the face of another person, which dissolves alterity and individuality. Proximity 
becomes important for the link between self and Other. We become isolated individuals reaching 
to a state of being for the Other, a ‘we’- relationship in which we are better with each other than 
without. We are better when we are side by side and physically close. The ‘we’ is ‘the plural form 
of “I”’ (Bauman 1993:47). As a moral person the ‘I’ has to take responsibility for the Other and it 
is this taking of responsibility, triggered by the gaze of the Other, that creates the ‘I’ as a moral 
self. 
 
As in Levians’s contribution to ethics, Bauman’s postmodern ethics are the ethics of love and 
caress. Bauman looks at caress as a metaphor for a moral relationship, reflecting a gesture like 
lovingly stroking the contours of the other’s body: 
 
 
the sight of l’Autre that triggers the moral impulse and recasts me as a moral subject through exposing 
me and surrendering/subordinating to the object of my responsibility (this happens already before l’Autre 
has a chance to open her/his mouth, and so before any demands or requests could be heard by me …) – 
even if the tactile, the caress, is a better metaphor for Lévinas’s model of what follows the awakening of 
the moral self (Bauman 2011a). 
 
 
The passage from being-with the Other to being-for the Other involves ‘love’ which Bauman de- 
scribes as resistance to objectification, an ‘awakening to the face’; the removal of masks that hides 
empathy and emotion that allows us to see the nakedness of the face and hear the ‘inaudible call 
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for assistance’ that allows us to comprehend the ‘vulnerability and weakness’ of the Other. The 
Other becomes my responsibility, a target for emotion, with responsibility-for-the-Other, power- 
over-the-Other and freedom vis-à-vis the Other identified by Bauman as the component parts of 
our ‘primal moral scene’ (Bauman 1995:64). Bauman explains that to act morally the self has to 
come to terms with what was thought to be incurable ambivalence, he makes clear what this rela- 
tionship and commitment to the Other’s welfare involves in ‘practical terms’ (Bauman 1995:69): 
 
 
My responsibility for the other …. includes also my responsibility for determining what needs to be done 
to exercise that responsibility. Which means in turn that I am responsible for defining the needs of the 
Other; what is good, and what is evil for the Other. If I love her and thus desire her happiness, it is my 
responsibility to decide what would make her truly happy (Bauman 1995:64-65). 
 
 
The post/liquid modern experience of intimacy is a ‘de-ethicized’ intimacy rooted in ‘flotation’ a 
condition which neutralizes moral impulses and moral considerations. The ‘primal scene’ of mo- 
rality is the face to face of the intimate; the moral part of two, which changes with the appearance 
of the third. It is with the presence of the third that our moral impulse pauses and awaits instruction. 
The presence of the third transforms the postmodern/liquid modern self into a sensation-gatherer; 
and for sensation-gatherer the Other ‘is made of rarefied and ethereal substance of impressions’ 
and to caress the Other is to explore the Other as a surface to be ‘stroked or licked – an object of 
tasting’ that ‘enters the world of the ego as an anticipated source of pleasure’ (Bauman 1995:122- 
123). 
 
Adiaphoria is a ‘floating of responsibility’ for the Other, with the separation of ‘pleasure/use 
value’ from the commitment to ‘love’. Adiaphoria leads to ‘the stripping of human relationships of 
their moral significance, exempting them from moral evaluation, rendering them ‘morally irrele- 
vant’ (Bauman 1995:133). Adiaphorization is set in motion when our relationship with another 
person is less than total; the person becomes ‘useful’ to us. It is only if a relationship is full in that 
it is with the whole self that it becomes ‘moral’ argues Bauman. In the postmodern condition, and 
one might assume in liquid modernity as well, there are four distinct life strategies or life-models 
identified by Bauman; each one self-contained and self-enclosed, restricting the creation of moral 
duties and responsibilities and potentially making our relationship with the Other fragmentary even 
in the most intimate of interactions; there is an ambivalence towards the Other, with the Other 
evaluated on aesthetic grounds in terms of their ability to promise joy and provide sensations rather 
than in terms of morality and responsibility for the Other’s welfare. At the same time the Other 
retains an element that is regarded as ‘sinister, menacing and intimidating … Mixophilia and mix- 
ophobia vie with each other’ (Bauman 1995:138). 
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Adiaphoria excludes some categories of people from claiming to be moral subjects and as 
such they are treated with moral insensitivity and are more likely to be exposed to suffering. There 
is then a causal connection for Bauman between moral insensitivity and the ability to commit acts 
of cruelty: ‘Modernity did not make people more cruel; it only invented a way in which cruel things 
could be done by non-cruel people’ (Bauman 1995:197-198). Not only does the Other have no 
voice when we take responsibility for them but their ‘consent was not called for’  (Bauman 
1995:201). 
 
The moral self is its own interpreter of the needs of the Other; the command of the Other is 
 
‘unspoken’: ‘It is the Other who commands me, but it is I who must give voice to that command, 
make it audible to myself’ (Bauman 1993:90). Bauman continues: ‘The Other is recast as my cre- 
ation … I have become the Other’s plenipotentiary, though I myself signed the power of attorney 
in the Other’s name. “The Other for whom I am” is my own interpretation of that silent, provocative 
presence’ (Bauman 1993:91). When Bauman’s moral self takes on the plenipotentiary role, the 
moral self becomes the all-powerful, perhaps even absolute representative of what she or he con- 
siders to be the interests and wishes of the Other. For Bauman the ‘I’ appears to become both 
legislator and interpreter of the Other, with the right to decide what is true in relation to the Other 
and also maintains the right to decide what is just for the Other. 
When the Third appears on the scene this changes the situation of ‘the moral party of two’ to 
a ‘moral society’ in which our innate moral impulse becomes ‘baffled’, pauses and requires in- 
structions. The arrival of the Third constitutes a group, and our moral proximity with the Other is 
replaced by ‘aesthetic proximity’; a condition in which ‘the Other’ becomes one of ‘the many’, the 
faceless crowd. Social space becomes a complex interaction of three interconnected processes for 
Bauman – cognitive spacing; aesthetic spacing and moral spacing. Cognitive spacing informs us 
of who we live with. This information becomes part of our taken for granted background 
knowledge or our ‘natural attitude’. The Other is not unknown to us but we may not know one 
specific human Other, we come to understand individuals as types of people not individual persons. 
Bauman identifies the origin of hostility towards the Other as a product of the ‘inner demons’ of 
frightened people who draw upon the culture to see anything that is not indigenous or alien as a 
source of pollution. 
Social organisation neutralizes our moral impulse by firstly creating distance in place of prox- 
imity; exempting some Others from our moral responsibility; assembling humans into aggregates; 
the effect of these changes is that social action becomes adiaphoric and as human agents we find 
ourselves in an ‘agentic state’ (Bauman 1993:123). Our moral capacity and responsibility for the 
Other becomes ‘floated’ and we engage in civil indifference ‘effacing the face’ of the Other who 
comes to be recognised as a set of traits rather than a person. In place of been with and for the Other 
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and we direct our concern away from the Other and towards ‘intermediaries’ within the immediate 
proximity of our community, people with whom we have physical co-presence such as ‘comrades 
in arms’ or ‘loyalty to mates’ (Bauman 1993:126). Culture is the assertion of our collective identity 
and its role with sociality is to be a mechanism of self-perpetuation or self-reproduction. Cognitive 
spacing helps to reduce such anxiety by informing people within the culture on how to view and 
respond to the Other and reminding the individual who they share a ‘we-relationship’ with. 
The Other argues Bauman ‘is a by-product of social spacing’ and ‘the otherness of the Other 
and the security of the social space (also, therefore, of the security of its own identity) are intimately 
related and support each other’ (Bauman 1993:237). Social spacing takes the form of a ‘cultural 
homogeneity’ and is maintained by the intensity of the ‘member’s dedication’ and ‘popular emo- 
tion’ and, as such, has a central role to play in identity building. When Bauman chooses to use the 
term ‘member’ to describe individuals within a community this explains why individuals who are 
seen not to be members are classed as ‘strangers’. The culture that members share is not based upon 
an innate impulse but based upon an ‘exclusivist ideology’ that stresses human differentiation and 
the categorical. This ‘exclusivist ideology’ has intensified with the dismantling of the Welfare State 
because without the state having as significant a role in providing a safety net, moral responsibility 
for providing help for the poor and people in need, becomes a private matter. As such, claims 
Bauman, ‘those who can buy themselves out from collective provisions – an act which turns out to 
mean, sooner or later, buying themselves out of collective responsibility’ (Bauman 1993:244). 
Culture, in its postmodern and liquid modern form, still maintains its ability to separate and 
banish on the basis of a ‘collective fear-fed zeal’ for self-defence (Bauman 1995:177-178). This 
ability which Bauman calls the ‘anthropoemic strategy’ is endemic to every society, through con- 
cepts such as tradition, community and ‘forms of life’ or ‘rhetoric of blood and soil’, culture pro- 
vides the underpinning communal cohesion, consensus and shared understanding for social spacing 
and is both inclusive and exclusive in that the Other comes to have their conditions and choices 
defined by it. Asserting ‘simultaneously its own identity and the strangehood of the strangers’ 
(Bauman 1995:190). Bauman (2011b) maintains that culture provides a communal belonging and 
‘identity stories’ that make meaningful interaction within communities possible. Such human 
bonds are not given by nature but based upon ‘fervour and commitment’ that they should continue 
(2011b:80-81). Bauman reflects upon this anthropological conception of culture with an examina- 
tion of human rights. Human rights were established for the benefit of individuals and were secured 
by joint effort. However with rights come boundaries and borders between the members of the 
community and the Other (2011b:90). 
There is an imaginary, hypothetical and elusive character to Bauman’s ethical perspective. 
 
Bauman adopts a culture driven, abstract, disembodied approach to issues of ethics and morality; 
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which contains an abstract conception of a generalised Other, applicable to all peoples classed as 
Other in all places and at all times. According to Seyla Benhabib, the generalised other is problem- 
atic because it abstracts real human individuals from their particular circumstances: 
 
 
The standpoint of the generalized other requires us to view each and every individual as a rational being 
entitled to the same rights and duties we would want to ascribe to ourselves. In assuming the standpoint, 
we abstract from the individuality and concrete identity of the other. We assume that the other, like 
ourselves, is a being who has concrete needs, desires and affects, but that what constitutes his or her 
moral dignity is not what differentiates us from each other, but rather what we, as speaking and acting 
rational agents, have in common ... The standpoint of the concrete other, by contrast, requires us to view 
each and every rational being as an individual with a concrete history, identity and affective-emotional 
constitution. In assuming this standpoint, we abstract from what constitutes our commonality, and focus 
on individuality. We seek to comprehend the needs of the other, his or her motivations, what she searches 
for, and what s/he desires (Benhabib 1992:158-159). 
 
 
Bauman’s ethical stance is universalistic in that it is restricted to the standpoint of the ‘generalized 
other’, his ethical stance is not preoccupied with the details of specific relationships or with a ‘par- 
ticular other’. Bauman falls in the trap identified by Hannah Arendt of transforming a who into a 
what. The Other for Arendt is often viewed as a lonely, politically marginal figure who: ‘usually 
enter the historical scene in times of corruption, disintegration, and political bankruptcy’ (Arendt 
1958:180). Otherness is an important aspect of plurality but human distinctiveness, the distinct 
quality of alteritas possessed by all things is not the same as Otherness. Through speech and action 
people distinguish themselves rather than being merely distinct. It is though speech that people 
present themselves to others not as physical objects, or sets of characteristics but as unique indi- 
viduals: As Arendt explains: ‘With word and deed we insert ourselves into the human world’ (Ar- 
endt 1958:176). Moreover, the unique personal identity of the Other can only be hidden in silence. 
It is silence that transforms a who into a what: 
 
 
The moment we want to say who somebody is, our very vocabulary leads us astray into saying what he 
is; we get entangled in a description of qualities he necessarily shares with others like him; we begin to 
describe a type or a ‘character’ ... With the result that his specific uniqueness escapes us (Arendt 
1958:181). 
 
 
 
In developing his care-and-responsibility orientation Bauman has no inclination to take the stand- 
 
point of a ‘particular other’ as such Bauman has no respect for a ‘particular other’s’ needs. The 
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Other for Bauman is a disembedded and disembodied being. Bauman defines the Other, decides 
the needs of the Other and what should be done in the interests of the Other. The acquisition of 
moral competencies in relation to the definition of and needs of the generalised Other are derived 
from the culture ‘we’ not the Other share. 
Ethical impartiality and the application of responsibility are based upon learning to recognize 
the claims of the Other as defined by the culture we are socialised into. The Other has a culturally 
defined identity that makes the Other different but should be treated as a person just like oneself 
and as such needs no voice because as long as we accept the moral imperative that the Other should 
be treated as we would treat ourselves, as such as this stance constitutes fairness and justice in the 
public sphere. Rights and duties are culturally defined not negotiated with the Other as is the most 
appropriate way arbitrate conflict and distribute rewards. Such a stance confirms the common hu- 
manity that the Other shares with us and our understanding of their human individuality. Moreover, 
the process of abstracting from his or her identity and ignoring the distinct content standpoint of 
the concrete other leads to epistemic incoherence in universalistic ethical theories. Bauman rejects 
reciprocity in our ethical dealings with the Other yet it is reciprocity that provides the capability 
and skill to adopt the standpoint of the Other, to imaginatively put ourselves in the position of the 
other and see the other as different with distinct needs and desires. In Bauman’s position there is 
no attempt at a mutual understanding of Otherness. 
Taking our starting point from Benhabib (1992), we can also identify that Bauman makes a 
distinction between ‘an ethics of justice and rights’ that is communitarian in nature and rooted in 
culture and an ‘ethics of care and responsibility’ that involves the imposition of what we feel to be 
right and wrong for the concrete real Other person. We see here the assumption Bauman (1993, 
1995) makes that what is good for us is good for the Other. We understand the care that we need 
and so understand the care that the Other needs. Care and responsibility also become abstract, uni- 
versal and imposed upon the Other. What is good for us in our society and culture is assumed to be 
good for all, everywhere including the Other. Bauman’s responsibility for the Other with no voice 
is little more than blind domination. Culture compels us to think and act towards the Other in spe- 
cifically determined ways. The distinctive and unique elements of the individual’s humanity are 
emptied from the Other and they appear before us as an object for our responsibility. The Other is 
unable to articulate how they should be judged or treated, unless such a request is in accord with 
the view established within the we relationship. 
 
 
New Public Sphere: The Way Out of the Contemporary Interregnum 
 
In his post 2000 ‘liquid turn’ writings, Zygmunt Bauman has come to identify the public space in 
 
terms of ‘collectivities of belonging’ in which new forms of communitarian politics can emerge 
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that give the community some have some influence or direction over the consequences of liquefac- 
tion. However, the task of establishing this new public sphere is all the more difficult because 
‘culture’ has been distorted by market forces from its original Enlightenment-inspired form in 
 
which there were ‘people’ to ‘cultivate’, into a form within liquid-modernity in which consists of 
 
‘offerings’, a ‘warehouse of meant-for-consumption products’ not ‘norms’ and is described as 
something which is ‘willingly pursued’; and within which choice is unavoidable; regarded as both 
a ‘life necessity’, and a ‘duty’ for the individual consumers. Choice is characterised by “seduction, 
not normative regulation; PR, not policing; creating new needs/desires/wants, not coercion” (Bau- 
man 2009:157, 2010:399). This liquid modern culture allows the individual clients to be seduced 
without ‘stiff standards’, a culture that serves all tastes while privileging none, a culture that en- 
courages fitfulness and ‘flexibility’. Unlike solid-modernity there is an abandonment of the at- 
tempts at assimilation of the stranger into the dominant culture in an effort to take away the strange- 
ness of the stranger. We can no longer assume ‘collectivities of belonging’ or ‘integrating of com- 
munities’. Culture within liquid modernity is characterised by difference but not necessarily a cel- 
ebration of difference. 
Bauman argues in favour of an expanded role for a new public sphere that emerges out of life 
politics. Bauman takes his starting point an understanding of the public sphere from Hannah Arendt 
who suggests that the public sphere gathers us together: ‘the public realm relies on the simultaneous 
presence of innumerable perspectives in which the common world presents itself and for which no 
common measurement or denominator can ever be devised’ (Arendt 1958:57). The term ‘public’ 
for Arendt signifies two closely related phenomena: First; ‘everything that appears in public can 
be seen and heard by everybody and has the widest possible publicity’ in which no activity can 
become excellent if it is outside of the public sphere. Second; the public life is distinct from the 
intimate life. The public sphere is a space in which reasoned arguments about the contested aspects 
of social and political life can be addressed. However, one might ask how engagement within a 
public sphere is possible given Bauman’s assumptions about the nature of solidarity in post and 
liquid modernity. Also because inequalities of power continue to pervade the public sphere, issues 
are raised about how the public sphere is to be constituted and how the legitimacy of the sphere is 
to be maintained. Why would a politics of such a public sphere not be manipulated by the powerful? 
There is then a contradiction in Bauman at this point; as life politics is the politics of the new 
public sphere and yet life politics is a politics of rebellious subjectivity. In addition, there are prac- 
tical problems in terms of how such a public sphere could emerge, given that that both post and 
liquid moderns define themselves first and foremost as consumers and orientate themselves and 
their life strategies, towards the enjoyment of acquired use values within their personal/private 
sphere. 
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There is the additional question of what is the public sphere expected to do? Is this sphere a 
recreation of the political community in which the existing legislators are replaced by new people? 
Or is the role of the public sphere to get the existing legislators to make better decisions, by giving 
voice to the community so that the legislator’s decisions are more responsive? Is the role of the 
public sphere to stop the process of liquefaction, strengthen social solidarity and allow the emer- 
gence of socialism as an active utopia? 
The conceptual problems and difficulties that affect Bauman’s social analysis surface with 
renewed force when he reflects upon life on the far side of the contemporary interregnum. One of 
the reasons why his conception of the public sphere is not convincing is because Bauman does not 
present a convincing account of how post and liquid modern identities emerged. How and why did 
it come about that rampant consumerism emerged and made people adopt life strategies in which 
they came to view themselves and others in terms of use values? In Bauman’s work there is no 
account of how the changes in global capitalism that brought about the shift from the society of 
producers to the society of consumers came about. 
Bauman does explain that in the liquid modern world political boundaries have become po- 
rous and the state has limited abilities to counteract the consequences of the flows of capital:’“the 
fast accelerating vehicle of progress’ (Bauman 2010:40). Given that problems affect us on a global 
scale such problems can only be solved if we ‘raise human integration to the level of humanity, 
inclusive of the whole population of the planet’ (Bauman 2010:69). The ‘democratic paradigm’ 
remains important in the creation of a ‘good society’ ‘invested in the democratic form of human 
cohabitation and self-government’ (Bauman 2010:56) supported by a culture of values and prac- 
tices to ‘nurture equality, cooperation and freedom’ by self-critique and reform. To this end the 
state is ‘indispensable ... for the sake of making the equality of humans feasible (I would say 
“dreamable”) if not real’ (Bauman 2010:60). And what is this global public sphere aiming to 
achieve? What will the new global public sphere achieve at an alternative to the contemporary 
interregnum? Bauman makes his position clear we need ‘intervention in the markets’: ‘to impose 
limits on consumption and raise local taxation to the levels required by the continuation, let alone 
further expansion, of social services’ (Bauman 2010:69). Such an approach does not address the 
very real quality of life issues, for example in relation to the sexuality of the Other that underpin 
life politics, ethical issues where solutions are not to be found in the distribution of tax income or 
welfare state expansion. 
Within the individual there are two contradictory forces at work; on the one hand Bauman 
identifies an innate moral impulse that identifies the moral way forward as being with and for the 
Other and to demand nothing back in return: ‘moral impulse, moral responsibility, moral intimacy 
that supplies the stuff from which the morality of human cohabitation is made’ (Bauman 1993:35). 
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Alternatively people are socialised into a common culture that provides individuals with cognitive 
frames of reference, this culture has an adiaphoric effect on the individuals – in both solid and 
liquid modernity, but for different reasons. The adiaphoric state is a common explanatory mecha- 
nism in Bauman’s analysis of solid modernity, including both Nazism and Stalinism, postmoder- 
nity and liquid modernity; it is the concept that Bauman draws upon to explain what it is that makes 
‘ethical considerations irrelevant to action’ (Bauman 1999:46). The agentic state is then the oppo- 
site of a state of individual autonomy and responsibility. In terms of the Holocaust, the sociality of 
the face-to-face relationship was dispersed into a field of technological representation. Actions are 
said to become ‘morally adiaphoric’ (Bauman 1993:125) when authority for an action is removed 
from the agent’s behaviour, individuals do not have to face the moral content of their actions, what 
Bauman describes as a situation of ‘floated responsibility’ (Bauman 1993:126) or what Arendt 
described as the ‘rule of nobody’ (Bauman 1993:126). The adiaphoric state is rooted in a hatred of 
impurity. Bauman accepts Arendt’s position that the reality of human existence is a ‘conditioned 
existence’ and the ‘world’s reality’ is experienced as a ‘conditioning force’. The processes of ra- 
tionalisation or liquefaction impact directly upon the central nervous system of the individual as a 
determining or conditioning force external to the individual, suspending the individual’s moral 
agency to the degree that the moral content of an action is placed outside of the consciousness of 
the agent. In the same way that switching off the lights in a room makes us blind to the objects 
about us. Rationalisation or liquefaction simply enters the mind as the uninvited guest, brings about 
a set of behaviours and leaves without agency being affected by the contact or the experience. 
In his work with Leonidas Donskis, Bauman and return to the adiaphorizing effects of social 
processes that encourage moral irrelevance and dehumanization of the Other: ‘the liquid modern 
variety of adiaphorization is cut after the pattern of the consumer-commodity relation, and its ef- 
fectiveness relies on the transplantation of that pattern to inter-human relations’ (Bauman and Don- 
skis 2013:15). Mass consumption has come to have an overwhelming grasp on the happiness of 
post and liquid moderns. Bauman appears to agree with Herbert Marcuse in An Essay on Liberation 
(1969) that consumerism has created a second nature that ties people libidinally to the commodity. 
Although Bauman does not address the questions of how was it that the moral impulse did not 
become commodified? And why did our soul and humanity not also become commodified? Bau- 
man ends up presenting a contradictory image of the individual who is on the one hand endowed 
with a moral impulse and on the other prevented from acting upon this impulse because of the 
adiaphorizing effects of external social processes which prevent the individual viewing their own 
actions as cruel or immoral and such adiaphorizing effects are assumed to exist in all forms of solid 
and liquid modernity. In solid modernity adiaphoria is generated by the processes of rationalization 
and the “reality principle”, whilst in post modernity and liquid modernity adiaphoria is generated 
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by consumption and the “pleasure principle”. However, the creation of a new public sphere is prob- 
lematic for Bauman because in his work the relationship between self and other is a relationship of 
being-to-being mediated by culture, making the relationship both being-to-being and knowledge- 
to-knowledge. We perceive the Other through culture, and it is culture that underpins the very thing 
that others the Other. Making Bauman’s Other both particular and abstract; an individual human 
being perceived as a generalised other. 
As we would expect, by taking his starting point from Kant’s categorical imperative and 
understanding a moral act as ‘duty’. Being with the Other and for the Other can only be conceived 
on the basis of the knowledge we possess, within the context provided by culture. However, there 
is a problem with this position, as Keith Tester (1997) explains: ‘Bauman is too aware of history 
not to know that hatred cannot be ignored. But his commitment to a narrative of Culture which 
stresses universal and almost spiritual human qualities and capacities means that he gives the 
chance of hatred rather less weight than it merits’ (Tester 1997:140). To fully accept the Other we 
would have to develop the capacity to think beyond our culture, to stretch the limits of our 
knowledge, cognition and language. This process would in the first instance involve a form of intra- 
subjective separation from our ontological framework as the first step in allowing us to think of the 
world that is different from what we previously imagined so that a possibility for non-antagonistic 
inter-human relationships with the Other could be possible. However, this raises the cultural issue 
of trust. How can we trust a person who is not one of us? The Other appears to have knowledge 
that we do not possess and that is the source of the perceived threat they pose; and the culture of 
all forms of modernity makes people weary of difference and it is this culturally bound concern 
about difference that is contained within our cognitive frame of reference that underpins the process 
of Othering with modernity. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
There is an impartial and universal nature to the argument in Zygmunt Bauman’s deontological 
ethical analysis. Individuals do not make moral choices alone in an isolated context but rather in- 
dividual’s modes of moral subjectivity and moral choices are made within a cultural context. To 
quote  Keith  Tester  again:  ‘Bauman’s  work  is  fully within  the  compass  of  Culture’  (Tester 
1997:135). Making the moral world regular, orderly and linked to solidarity. The generalised Other 
becomes a ‘concocted homunculi’ an ‘aggregate of spare parts and aspects’. If the Other has a voice 
in Bauman’s ethical writings, that voice is provided by Bauman himself. Members of the culture 
are presented by Bauman as the legislators and interpreters of the needs, wishes and desires of the 
Other. In addition, there is a Manicheanism underpinning Bauman’s approach to ethics most clearly 
seen in his comments on sexuality; a belief that there is a fundamental division between forces of 
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good and forces of evil in the world. Taking his starting point from the division of orientation 
between an ‘ethic of ultimate ends’ versus an ‘ethic of responsibility’, first outlined by Max Weber 
in his 1918 lecture on “Politics as a Vocation”, Bauman suggests that an ‘ethic of ultimate ends’ is 
based upon the idea that the end justifies the means, it may be necessary to engage in actions which 
are morally questionable such as bombing civilian targets in order to achieve an important political 
goal. The alternative is to be with and for the Other and to take responsibility for the Other. Both 
positions involve taking what is assumed to be the morally superior standpoint, in that the intention 
in both positions to bring about a better situation. However, both positions in the last analysis lead 
to human beings coming to be viewed as objects in the world. 
Zygmunt Bauman’s ethical stance places an emphasis on social justice, social and political 
rights that are by their nature simply right not wrong and that the moral content of an action is not 
dependent on its consequences. The only ‘good’ thing in itself is a good intention, however acting 
on the basis of a ‘good’ motive or good intention can also cause harm, such as the unwanted impo- 
sition of ‘love’ or ‘caress’, if the Other is allowed no voice. If individuals do not examine what 
may be achieved from an ethical action, including what good can come from their acting ethically 
and speculating on possible unforeseen consequences of their action them harm to the Other many 
result. This is more so if the needs of the Other are assessed solely from our own point of view. As 
Bauman rightly points out a self-founding morality is ‘blatantly and deplorably, ethically un- 
founded’ (Bauman 1995:18) but this does not prevent him from developing such a self-founding 
morality in his own work. It is the voice of the Other, which Bauman chooses to silence in his 
ethical writings, the very thing that makes that person unique and allows the Other to express their 
autonomy and choice of outcome. For Bauman, it is unreasonable to ignore dispossessed Others 
but this is not in itself an ethical stance if there is no possibility of entering into a dialogue with the 
Other, allowing them to come into the new public sphere and allow the Other to participate in the 
formation of a shared understanding of what is needed to be done. Bauman needs to deconstruct 
the paternalistic, benevolent emotions and feeling states that underpin the ethical perspective of 
doing things on behalf of the Other because we feel it is in their own best interest. Bauman’s ethical 
stance raises the question of who will guard the ethical consequences of Bauman’s individual hav- 
ing unlimited power over the Other. Who is going to identifying if the loving, caressing and being 
with and for the Other is in the interests of the Other or meets the needs of the Other. 
Zygmunt Bauman’s ethics does not have the commitment to the Other’s alterity as the start- 
ing point of ethical responsibility as in the work of Emmanuel Lévinas. For Lévinas every individ- 
ual is unique and maintains a quality of otherness that he terms alterity, by which he means that the 
Otherness transcends all other categories and concepts. For Lévinas there is much to be discovered 
within the individual inter-personal encounters with the Other. For Lévinas the relationship with 
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the Other is one that that involves learning from the Other, without the purpose of placing one’s 
own interpretation of need onto the Other. It is this unknown content that the self uncovers in the 
encounter with the Other that initiates the ethical quality or the association between self and Other. 
There is an a posteriori element in Lévinas’s approach to ethics that is missing from Bauman’s 
approach. Bauman’s ethical account insufficient because, despite being focussed on been with and 
for the Other, it rejected the idea of the Other as a unique individual thus failing to provide a suitable 
basis for ethics in Lévinas’s terms. There is a duty of the self to the Other in Bauman’s approach 
but at a cost in terms of undermining the Other’s reciprocal role in providing content to the ethical 
relationship. As such Bauman’s voiceless and passive Other is denied full ethical status within the 
ethical relationship. Bauman’s underpinning Socialism means that the emphasis between self and 
Other is on material considerations. In Lévinas’s terms the Other cannot be comprehended by 
knowledge derived from the self’s own perception of need in the way that Bauman attempts to do 
so. We may also want to question Bauman’s assumption that we can only flourish in a socialist 
utopia, an egalitarian society where there are strict controls over the level of consumption one 
person can engage in and the state intervenes to distribute income spent on unnecessary consump- 
tion to people less fortunate via a welfare state. As suggested above the Other may not want to live 
in a socialist utopia and many of the problems that people, including the Other face in relation to 
self-realisation in relation to identity, such as their preferred gendered or sexual identity are not 
going to be resolved by a forced redistribution of other people’s income. 
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